

Karsai, László: *The Fateful Year: 1942 in the Reports of Hungarian Diplomats*

On December 2, 1942, Döme Sztójay, Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin had to hand over a firmly worded memorandum from his government to the German Foreign Ministry. The anti-Semitic Hungarian ambassador did not approve of his government's refusal to carry out the demands the Germans had handed over in Budapest on October 17. In the memorandum, the government of Miklós Kállay (March 9, 1942 to March 22, 1944) made it clear that they did not regard as possible either the introduction of the yellow star of David, or the deportation of the Hungarian Jews.

Below I shall endeavour to reconstruct why and upon what information the Hungarian cabinet decided in late autumn of 1942 to defend "their own" Jews. One of the most important reasons for the decision was mentioned to Martin Luther, Assistant Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry by Sztójay himself on October 5. He mentioned, among others, that he knew from his previous talks with Kállay that the Hungarian Premier "... was especially interested in whether the Jews deported to the East would be given the possibility for continuing existence. There were certain rumours circulating in connection with that, which he, naturally, did not believe, but which were slightly worrying Premier Kállay." Actually, Sztójay not only "believed" that most of the Jews deported to the East were massacred in the death camps, but it was he who forwarded most of the information concerning the Nazi policies concerning the Jews to Budapest. Sztójay was careful not to mention to Luther that he himself was one of the chief sources of the rumours "slightly worrying" the Hungarian Prime Minister. On October 3, 1942, describing Hitler's speech of September 30, he reported to Kállay that "Chancellor Hitler repeatedly, and with the strongest terms inveighed against the Jews, whose extermination he promised. This constantly recurring, firm, and extremist attitude of his leaves no doubt that there is much more than empty propaganda behind his words, and there are facts to prove it, anyway." It can even be established with relative certainty from when the „well-informed” in Budapest knew that the Nazis were murdering the Jews they had put their hands on. György Ottlik, editor-in-chief of *Pester Lloyd*, a German language daily, which was close to the government, made a prolonged trip in Western Europe between August 18 and September 28, 1942. He visited Sztójay in Berlin, who, according to Ottlik, „... would rather Hungary did not wait until the urgent emergence of the issue [i.e. the Jewish question], but instead sped up the pace of the change of guard and deported a considerable portion of our Jewish population to occupied Russia. Our ambassador first mentioned 300,000 people, then, haggling with himself, lowered the number to 100,000. Upon my interspersed remark, he made no secret of the fact that this would mean not deportation but execution.” Although this document was already published nearly forty years ago, nobody has noticed what the conversation between the well-informed journalist from Budapest and the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin, even better informed than Ottlik in matters concerning the Holocaust, implied. What it implied was that at the latest in August, 1942 it was already a matter of common knowledge even in journalist circles in Budapest that if the Hungarian Jews were to be deported, that would be equal to their being executed.

All that should be cleared now is what „facts” concerning the European Jewish Holocaust the Hungarian political leadership was informed about, and when before August, 1942. We shall attempt to answer that question on the basis of the contemporary reports of the diplomats of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a corpus of sources known by relatively few so far, and researched mostly by myself. Arranging these reports in a chronological order, it is

possible to reconstruct precisely when and what information Hungarian decision makers received in connection with the Holocaust. News from the eastern front, of the carnages of the *Einsatzgruppen*, or of events in neighbouring countries were brought or could be brought by intelligence agents, soldiers, gendarme detectives and even private civilians. So far, no publication has treated the reports that came in from the Hungarian military police and other military organs operating in occupied Soviet territories.

As the leader of the Hungarian Research Team of the Yad Vashem Archives (YVA), I have been researching the papers of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1938 and 1945. Our imaginary perspective might be that of, say, the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, who received all reports, even ones labeled as “top secret”, “confidential”, “for your eyes only”, etc. The amount of the extant papers of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry is considerable. In 1942, Hungarian diplomats were serving in 30 European cities, and in the Vatican, not counting honorary consulates. The building of the Foreign Ministry was in the Castle of Buda, in the heart of the elegant government district, a few steps from the palace of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Defense, and a stone's throw from the Ministries of Finance and the Interior. The Hungarian diplomats serving in various European countries were highly trained, multilingual, much-travelled, experienced men. Every city particularly important with respect to the history of the Holocaust had Hungarian diplomats serving in them from Athens to Sofia, from Berlin to Zagreb. These were people of different origin and outlook. In the Ministry on Dísz tér the more important departments were headed by men with titles of nobility if not aristocracy.

There were no Jews, or persons of Jewish descent in the central apparatus at all, but the diplomats included quite a number of pro-Nazi anti-Semites, whose typical representative was Döme Sztójay mentioned above, as well as liberals, and philo-Semites. László Velics, Ambassador in Athens, or Péter Matuska, Ambassador in Stockholm belonged to the latter group, for example. According to what we know today it would seem that the political views of individual diplomats influenced what post they were given. That is how Sztójay was able to keep his post in Berlin from 1935 until March, 1944, when he became Prime Minister of the collaborationist Hungarian cabinet after the German occupation of Hungary. László Velics, having represented Hungary in Geneva with the League of Nations for years, went on to serve in Athens from 1940 to 1944.

The diplomats acquired their information, as will be shown, from a great variety of sources. They monitored the local press and radio, kept in touch with their fellow diplomats and with the local authorities. Hungarian diplomats had access to valuable information at Arad, Temesvár and in Bucharest through the local Jewish Councils, too. The Ministries of Defense and the Interior maintained regular, daily working relations with the Foreign Ministry, sending each other copies of the reports they received concerning foreign affairs, indeed, copies of such reports found their way to Berlin, Rome, and Bucharest. Not only political decision-makers, but Jews also may (might) have taken note that during 1942 Hitler repeated several times the "prophecy" he had announced on January 30, 1939, in which he had "predicted" that the Jews would be destroyed in the world war. It was on January 2, 1942, in the manifesto he addressed to the German people from the Führer's headquarters that he first mentioned "the great front of national states", which was "engaged in a war with the Judeo-capitalist-bolshevik world conspiracy". However, he reassured his faithful, saying, "The Jew will not exterminate the nations of Europe, but on the contrary, he will fall victim of his own murderous attempt."

The Hungarian diplomats and their superiors knew only too well that for Nazi Germany it was a cardinal question, the touchstone of alliance and friendship, how individual countries solved their own "Jewish questions". Berlin regarded a country as a reliable ally (I.) if it was ready to put all its human and natural resources at the disposal of the struggle against Bolshevism; (II.) if, simultaneously, it took steps to radically solve the Jewish question. The German *Reich* regarded Hungary as one of its least reliable allies in both respects. It was with distrust mixed with incomprehension that Berlin received the news of the dismissal of Premier László Bárdossy, and Sztójay had a hard time convincing the Germans that Miklós Kállay, the new prime minister, would carry on the foreign policy of his predecessor. During 1942 it became clear that the neighbouring countries, Croatia, Slovakia, and Rumania were following a much more radical line than Hungary regarding the Jews. Under such circumstances, Hungarian diplomacy was obliged to be permanently on the defensive concerning the Jewish question: they yet had to prove their unwobbling loyalty as allies, but the Croatians, Slovaks, and Rumanians had every right to say precisely concerning the Jewish question that they were Aryanizing/Rumanizing, etc. Jewish property, deporting, mass-murdering while hardly a hair of the Jews' head was hurt in Hungary.

The report by a "confidential person", i.e. an intelligence agent, or local, undercover informant that the Ministry of the Interior informed the Foreign Ministry about was dated January 26, 1942. It was reported from Bánát, part of the former Yugoslavia currently under German occupation, that extensive executions took place there on January 9, and the Jews were "all carried away, so now there is not a single Jew there. Both the deportation of the Jews and the mass executions reported above were arranged by the imperial German authorities." Lajos Bolla, Hungarian Consul-General in Belgrade mentions the "dejewification" of Serbia in several reports. On February 3, he wrote, "... the German occupying authorities have interned all the Jews both in Serbia and in Bánát without respect to citizenship. A part of the women and children have been placed into the pavilions of the Belgrade International Fair, while the men are partly working in labour camps within Serbia, and partly have been transported to location unknown."

The Nazi Jewish policy of Serbia was completely in keeping with the "self-fulfilling prophecy" that Hitler repeated a second time in that year in his speech of January 30: "I already declared in the *Reichstag* on September 1, 1939 — and I am not one given to rash predictions — that this war will not end the way the Jews imagine it will, that is, with them exterminating the Aryan peoples of Europe, but that the outcome of the war will be the destruction of Jewry." At the end of February Hitler repeated his prediction a third time.

When officials of the Foreign Ministry learnt in early March, 1942, that the Jews in Slovakia were to be deported to the territory of the *Generalgouvernement* in Occupied Poland, they immediately went into action. They asked the leaders of the Ministry of the Interior to reinforce the guarding of the borders because, according to information they had received, Jews were fleeing to Hungary *en masse*. Ambassador Lajos Kuhl in Bratislava was among the first to understand what fate awaited the deported. He wrote the following in his report of March 13: "The Jews, threatened no longer only in their possessions but in their very lives, are doing everything to avoid being deported, which means nearly certain death, and their attention in that respect, for want of other possibilities, has turned, unfortunately, to Hungary... I have received reports from several reliable sources in the last few days that the Jews here openly declare that they would rather spend their whole lives in detention centres or internment camps in Hungary than allow themselves to be deported..."

The development of the Jewish policy in Rumania was always followed with close attention in Hungary. The Rumanian authorities, which were anti-Semitic but also hated Hungarians, sometimes warned the Hungarian inhabitants of Southern Transylvania that they would soon share the fate of the Jews, the Hungarian Consul at Brassó (Brasov) reported. "This, naturally, causes panic among the population." And that threat could frighten only people who had heard something about the fate of the Jews deported to Transnistria.

Around this time Lajos Kuhl got access to the plan of the Slovakian deportation bill, which contained the following reasons adduced: "Based on talks with competent German imperial factors, the Republic of Slovakia will be able to get rid of all its Jews." Before long, Budapest was informed how, in what circumstances the Jews of Slovakia were being deported. "According to reliable sources and eye-witnesses, Ambassador Kuhl reported, the Hlinka Guards, charged with rounding up the Jews, rob the deportees of all their possessions save the clothes they are wearing, and transport them to their destination crowded in closed cattle-cars." Deportation was conducted so savagely that in some parts of the country the gendarmerie had to intervene because the Slovakian peasants turned against the Hlinka Guards, at least according to the information Kuhl received. At the end of his report he clearly placed the responsibility for the deportations on the Germans, saying, "... the government of Slovakia was, upon orders from above, forced to undertake the experimental role of the first, completely Jew-free country..." The sad distinction of the first, "completely Jew-free country", however, went to Serbia, and not Slovakia. The Hungarian Ministry of the Interior informed the Foreign Ministry, on the basis of information from a "confidential person", that "[t]he situation of the Jews is the most intolerable in Serbia. As of today only two Jewish families are said to be living in Belgrade, the others have been killed or carried off to places unknown. In Bánát, all the remaining Jews, who had survived the bloodshed there, were carried to the inside of the country after the occupation to serve as forced labourers, their whereabouts and fate being unknown."

Döme Sztójay listened to every sentence, indeed, every gesture and emphasis of Hitler's. He was able to report as an eye-witness on the speech the Führer made in the *Reichstag* on April 26. He emphasized in his four-page, detailed analysis that Hitler dwelt at some length upon „Bolshevism under Jewish control”, this „doubly deadly danger”. Hitler, said Sztójay, used the word „Jew” 28 times in his speech, „... that is, more frequently than in his speeches so far, and in a more energetically intoned manner in his intonation, too.” Reading Hitler's speech, one can immediately understand what the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin meant when speaking about „the more energetically intoned manner” of mentioning the Jews. This time, Hitler denounced the Jews in an even more hateful manner.

Sometimes the submissions of private individuals yielded valuable information for the authorities with respect to what the „man in the street” knew about the fate of his deported relatives. Sándor Lieber turned to none other than the „Guardian Angel of Hungarian mothers”, the wife of Regent Miklós Horthy, with his application, in which he wrote that his wife and daughter had been deported from Prague to Theresienstadt by the German authorities on April 5 although they were Hungarian citizens with Hungarian passports. Informed about that on April 14, he immediately turned to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, but to no avail. On July 21, his sickly wife notified him that „they were seriously in danger of being taken to Poland.” Sándor Lieber was now praying for Her Serene Highness to save his wife and daughter from „death”. In the Foreign Ministry Miklós Kállay himself had given instructions on May 12 to attempt the release of Mrs. Lieber and her minor child (Márta Lieber, born in 1927). Márió Spányi, Consul in Prague informed the Foreign Ministry in a cipher telegram on

July 17 that „... the German authorities, for reasons of principle, refuse to return persons deported to internment camps.”

The only neighbouring country that Hungary managed to develop friendly relations with during World War II, with the exception of the great German *Reich*, of course, was Croatia. Already early in May the Foreign Ministry received information from confidential police sources that during the celebrations of the first anniversary of the foundation of the State of Croatia „the persecution of Jews and Serbs of Greek Orthodox religion [had] relented to some extent although during the festivities approximately one hundred thousand people were taken into custody. According to confidential information I have received, some one hundred and fifty thousand persons have been killed in the present territory of Croatia, most of them Jews and Serbs of Greek Orthodox religion.”

It was well-known in Budapest in the spring of 1942 that certain death awaited the deportees of Slovakia. In that situation, government officials, headed by Miklós Kállay, had two main goals: (I). to save and bring to Hungary at least the property of those Jews who could prove their Hungarian citizenship; (II). to prevent Slovakian Jews from escaping *en masse* into Hungary. Premier Kállay, who was also Foreign Minister, turned to the Ministry of the Interior in the middle of May, saying that according to his information it was easy for the Jews in Slovakia to acquire certificates of Hungarian municipal residence, which in turn enabled them to legitimately apply for Hungarian passports. Kállay wrote, „It strikes one that Hungarian municipalities issue certificates of residence one after the other for Jews who have for years been living in the territory of Czechoslovakia and/or Slovakia, have even acquired citizenship there, and would never dream of returning to Hungary were it not for the risk of deportation.” Kállay asked the officials of the Interior concerned to cause the competent sub-prefects to make the issuing of these certificates more difficult. Kállay must have been aware that not only was his instruction to the Ministry of the Interior illegal, but it also risked the lives of the Jews in Slovakia who were otherwise entitled to apply for the recognition of their domicile in Hungary. Incidentally, dozens of examples can show that such certificates of municipal residence were issued by the representative bodies of villages and towns after a close examination of land registers, tax records, and on the basis of clear evidence only.

It was in May that Márió Spányi, the Hungarian Consul in Prague, first reported that German „official practice” had „significantly changed with regard to the Jewish question”. That is, they had started to ruthlessly de-jewify the Czech-Moravian Protectorate as well. In another report, which reveals that he basically agreed with the policy applied to the Jews in the Protectorate, Spányi wrote that there „the Jewish question will soon be solved as a result of continuous large-scale deportations and other, relevant and useful measures...”

Intelligence agents of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior reported in June, 1942, with reference to information from „higher German circles”, with a copy of the report finding its way to the Foreign Ministry, that „... a plan is being prepared that the troops that have for a prolonged period of time been operating on the eastern front, and have got accustomed to mass-murdering of Jews and other Russian populations not only on the front but in the rear areas as well, and have grown coarse with regard to the respect of private property and law, will not be brought home at the end of the war.” The Führer talked with burning hate about the Bolsheviki led by the Jews, the soldiers of the SS and the Wehrmacht were committing mass murders, and all that was clear for competent persons in Budapest.

At the time Bratislava also tried to exploit the fact that the Jewish policy Slovakia was pursuing was much more radical than that of Budapest. According to confidential information forwarded to the Chief of the General Staff, a closed meeting was held chaired by one of the leaders of the Hlinka Guards. The main point on the agenda was how the matter of the Slovakian Jews escaping to Hungary could be exploited by, for example, allowing Berlin to know that the Hungarian authorities were showing „very great forbearance” toward the refugees.

The flow of information within the Hungarian diplomatic corps was, naturally, good. Mihály Jungerth-Arnóthy, Hungarian Ambassador in Sofia, in one of his reports at the end of June, 1942, wrote that the Jewish question would eventually be solved in Bulgaria in the same way as in Slovakia or Croatia. The main reason for that was, according to Jungerth, that the members of the Bulgarian cabinet thought that „... Bulgaria not actually fighting in the battlefield, she should at least do her best to please the Axis powers in everything else, and act in the spirit of the new Europe.” In one part of the „new Europe”, in the Protectorate, the competent Nazis, as they themselves emphasized for Márió Spányi, Consul General in Prague, did not deport the Jews with Hungarian citizenship living there, „out of special consideration” and „exceptionally”. And that despite the increased and forced pace of the deportation of the Jews („*Entjudung des Protektorates*”). Spányi made a point of stressing in his report that the representatives of the deporting authorities had repeatedly emphasized before him that „... the National-Socialist state regarded Jews as the number one enemy (regardless of their citizenship) (Staatsfeind No. 1.)”

From mid-June, the Slovakian authorities deprived their citizens who had been deported or fled abroad of their citizenship. It was with reference to that measure that they refused to take back the Slovakian Jews captured in Hungary and taken to the border to be expelled. The report of Ambassador Lajos Kuhl in Bratislava makes it clear that the Jews fleeing from Slovakia perfectly knew that they would lose their citizenship, but they were even glad for that. „Thus they can hope with some justice that no serious harm would come to them in Hungary; they might be locked up in internment camps at most, but they would be able to save their lives.”

During 1942, the Foreign Ministry on Dísz tér was incessantly receiving reports on Serbia and the Czech-Moravian Protectorate becoming free of Jews (*Judenfrei*). In mid-August, László Bartók, *chargé d'affaires ad interim* at the Embassy in Zagreb reported that the last of the Jews, the old, the sick, and women, had been transported from the Croatian capital — to Lublin. According to Bartók's information, the “Italians” and the Archbishop of Zagreb had protested in vain against the deportations. By that time there were no more innocent souls in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to believe that the Germans would provide careful medical treatment for the sick Croatian Jews, and the aged would be accommodated in a comfortably equipped senior citizens' home in Lublin(Majdanek).

The literature on the subject has yet to convincingly establish what reasons of foreign and domestic policy prevented eventually the deportation of Jews living in the Old Kingdom of Rumania in September-October, 1942. It might be an interesting addition to the subject that according to information received by László Nagy, Hungarian Ambassador in Bucharest, the statistics of what he called „National Jewish Centre” indicated 274,000 Jews living in Rumania. László Nagy also knew that the August 8 number of *Bukarester Tageblatt* wrote about the planned deportation of the Rumanian Jews. He said it was very „interesting” that Rumanian-language newspapers had not written a word about it, „indeed, the Rumanian

government reproached the German paper for committing an indiscretion with its article, publishing the still secret plans of the government." Early in September even Tuka's assessment of the situation was that Hungary sooner or later would have to solve the Jewish question the same way as it was done in Slovakia. "First Rumania will do that... and then Hungary will follow suit," Ambassador Kuhl quoted the words of the Slovakian Prime Minister.

Incidentally it was not only at Hitler's anti-Jewish outbursts delivered with prophetic furor that the Hungarian officials could prick up their ears. With all the background knowledge they were privy to, they probably understood perfectly well the situation of the Jews the Berlin correspondent of the extremely right-wing daily *Új Magyarország* was describing. "The Jews in Berlin are very pale. Their faces are the pallid colour of wax, as if they were wearing death-masks, and when they pass by, I seem to hear their bones rattling." Hitler, incidentally, repeated his "Jew-murdering" prophecy for the fourth time within the year in his speech delivered in the Sports Palace of Berlin.

Chief of the General Staff Ferenc Szombathelyi was informed at the end of September, from the statistics of the "National Jewish Centre" in Rumania, that the Rumanians had so far killed exactly 177,591 Jews, and 30,000 of the remaining 272,409 had been deported to Transnistria.

Probably the most important and most precise piece of information concerning the Holocaust was received by the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior on October 7. According to the report of an unnamed professional detective, "[t]he German border guards issue 1 litre of warm water and 1 handful of bran as provisions for 1 day to Polish Jewish forced military labourers (the detective was present at the issue). The Jews not assigned to forced labour service are given nothing at all to eat, and they feed themselves with roots and leaves of trees. According to what the Germans say, the Jews will be eliminated in Poland in this year. The depositions of captured Jews confirm the above statements."

Ten days later Dietrich von Jagow, German Ambassador in Budapest handed over the memorandum written by Martin Luther, in which the German government demanded the branding of Hungarian Jews with the yellow star of David and the preparation of their deportation. In a manner quite unusual in diplomatic life, Premier Miklós Kállay replied the German government five days later in public, at the party conference of the governing party, the Party of Hungarian Life. He announced that a special property tax would be levied on Jews, the issue of the flats of the Jews would be settled, the appropriation of the lands of the Jews would continue, and, finally, he promised that Jews liable to military service would be summoned to labour camps. However, he did not even mention that the yellow star would be introduced in Hungary, or that the Jews would be deported from Hungary. On the contrary, Kállay very firmly declared that „[t]he government will stand up against not only the destruction of the Jews, but against those who see the Jewish question as the only problem in this country.” After this it could not have come as a surprise to the German government that in the memorandum, mentioned in the introduction, that Döme Sztójay formally handed over in Berlin on December 2, the Hungarian government refused to fulfill the German demands.

Conclusion

The anti-Semitic Hungarian politicians, like Regent Miklós Horthy, and most of the members of the Kállay cabinet, more moderate as they were compared to the Nazi mass-murderers, recoiled in 1942 from deporting the Hungarian Jews to death. They had access to a great amount of fairly reliable data, news, and information from various sources which indicated that the fate of the deportees would be death. They regarded the „disconnection” of 800,000 Jews as unimaginable and extremely dangerous with respect to the continuity of (military) production. Foreign policy considerations were equally important: formulating their Jewish policy, Hungarian officials kept their eyes not only on Berlin, but first of all on Rome, as well as on Bucharest and on Vichy. As long as Mussolini refused to allow the deportation of Italian Jews, and when, in October, 1942, the *Conducator*, Ion Antonescu stopped the deportation of the Rumanian Jews, the Hungarian leaders had someone and something to refer to. As Operation Torch was shining increasingly bright in North Africa, and the Red Army was exerting increasing pressure on the German forces at Stalingrad, Kállay and his colleagues regarded protecting their own Jews as a significant gesture toward the western Allies.

Döme Sztójay, protesting with the German Foreign Ministry on behalf of his government on August 10, 1942 because the Germans wanted to force Hungarian Jews in France to wear the yellow star of David while Rumanian and Italian Jews were exempted from that obligation, added while handing over the memorandum that personally “he found this task very unpleasant, as he characterized himself as a ‘pioneer’ of anti-Semitism.” Memorandum of August 11, 1942, of Assistant Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry, quoted by Browning, Christopher R.: *The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office. A Study of Referat D III. of Abteilung Deutschland 1940-1943*. New York-London, Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978, p. 105. Sztójay, Döme (1883-1946), Lt. General, Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin from 1935 to 1944. Prime Minister after the German occupation of Hungary. His government organized the deportation of 437,000 Hungarian Jews. Removed by Regent Horthy on August 29. After the war indicted, he was tried by the People's Court, and executed.

For the text of the memorandum, see: .: *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról 1933-1944* [Wilhelmstrasse and Hungary. Papers of German diplomacy on Hungary 1933-1944]. Budapest, Kossuth K., 1968, 701-704. Quotation: 703. – henceforth: *Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország* .

Assistant Secretary of State Martin Luther represented the German Foreign Ministry at the Wannsee conference on January 20, 1942. He had been head of Abteilung Deutschland since May, 1940, and his responsibilities included relations with the SS, the police, and Jewish affairs.

Luther's notes on his talks with Sztójay, October 6, 1942. In: *Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország* , 697.

Hungarian National Archives (Magyar Országos Levéltár, henceforth: OL)-K63- Political Department of the Foreign Ministry – 1942-21-190/pol. 1942 (October 3) Report of Döme Sztójay to Miklós Kállay.

OL-K63-1942-21/7.-437. Report of György Ottlik to Miklós Kállay. Quoted in: Karsai, Elek ed.: *Vádirat a náciizmus ellen. Dokumentumok a magyarországi zsidóüldözés történetéhez*

[Indictment against Nazism. Documents for the history of the persecution of Jews in Hungary]. Budapest, Magyar Izraeliták Országos Képviselete Kiadása, 1967, 64.

Szakály Sándor: *A magyar tábori csendország története 1938-1945* [A history of the Hungarian military police]. Budapest, Ister K., 2000.

In 1942 this position was held by Andor Szentmiklósy of Szentmiklós.

In alphabetical order: Amsterdam (consulate — c.), Ankara (embassy — e.), Arad (c.), Athens (e.), Belgrade (cg.), Berlin (e.), Bern (e.), Brasov (c.), Bratislava (e.), Brussels (c.), Bucharest (e.), Cologne (cg.), Geneva (cg.), Graz (c.), Helsinki (e.), Istanbul (cg.), Lisbon (e.), Madrid (e.), Milan (cg.), Munich (cg.), Paris (cg.), Prague (cg.), Rome (e.), Stockholm (e.), Sofia (e.), Trieste (e.), Vatican (e.), Venice (c.), Vichy (e.), Vienna (consulate general - cg.), Zagreb (e.).

Budapest, I. Ker. Vár, Dísz tér 2.

Sándor Hoffmann, counsellor at the Embassy in Berlin, met an old acquaintance, the former honorary consul of *Norway* in Belgrade, a Serbian reserve captain, at the place of the former *Swiss* ambassador in Belgrade, representative in Germany of English and American interests, early in January, 1942. OL- K63 –1942-16/7. -6/pol. 1942. (January 9.) Report of Hoffmann to the Foreign Ministry. Péter Matuska-Comáromy, Hungarian Ambassador in Stockholm met Carl Ivan Danielsson, Ambassador of Sweden in *Cairo* , whom he had befriended during his service in *Madrid* . As he reported, it was possible that his friend would not return to Cairo, and his next post would probably be Budapest. His information proved correct, Danielsson served in Budapest until the end of the war. OL-K63-1942-17- 58/pol.-1942. (July 4.) Report of Péter Matuska to Miklós Kállay.

The 1 st Presidential Department was headed in 1942 by Tibor Bartheldy of Zsarnócza, the 2 nd Protocol Department by Count Gyula Teleki, and the 3/b Cultural Department by Domokos Szent-Iványi of Iklód-Szent-Ivány and Gálfalva.

Matuska was probably glad to report, as an instance typical of the mood of the public in Norway, that he had discovered an advertisement in a newspaper offering the collected works of the anti-Semite and pro-Nazi Knut Hamsun, winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, for a song. Interested persons could have the books for free. OL-K63-1942-31- 64/pol. 1942. (July 27.) Report of Matuska to Kállay.

Új Magyarság , 1942. January 3. 1-2.

OL-K83-Papers of Berlin Embassy.-1942-48/pol.fon-1942. (March 20.) Report of Döme Sztójay to Miklós Kállay. László Bárdossy (1890-1946.) was Hungarian Ambassador in Bucharest from 1934 to 1941, when in February he was appointed Foreign Minister. Following the suicide of Premier Pál Teleki (April 3, 1941.), he became Prime Minister. Unable to prevent the extreme right from gaining strength, and finding himself in opposition to Regent Miklós Horthy over other issues of domestic policy, he was removed by Horthy on March 7, 1942. After the war he was tried before the people's court and executed.

OL-K63-1942-21/7.-BM 7163/1942. (January 26.) VII. res. – information report for the Foreign Ministry.

OL-K63-1942-16- 12/pol.-1942. (February 3.) Report of Lajos Bolla to László Bárdossy.

In the following years Hitler, both in public and in private conversation, dated his “prediction” originally uttered on January 30, 1939 to September 1.

For a new Hungarian edition of Hitler's speeches, see: Gede, Tibor ed.: *Küzdelem a sátánnal* [Struggle with Satan] Budapest, Gede testvérek K., 2001. (henceforth: *Küzdelem a sátánnal*) Quotation: 429.

„My prediction that this war will annihilate not the Aryan humanity but the Jew shall be fulfilled. Whatever this struggle may bring, however long it should take, this will be the final outcome, and only then, only after the removal of these parasites will the long period of the mutual understanding of peoples, and, with that, of real peace will come for the suffering world.” *Új Magyarország* , February 26, 1942.

OL-K63-65-44/pol.- 1942. (March 13.) Report of Lajos Kuhl to Miklós Kállay.

OL-K63-27/7-87/pol.-1942. (March 13.) Report of Zoltán Sztankay, Consul at Brasov to the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest.

OL-K63-65-52/pol.-1942. (March 26.) Report of Lajos Kuhl to Miklós Kállay.

OL-K63-65-59/pol.-1942. (April 9.) Report of Lajos Kuhl to Miklós Kállay.

OL-K63-1942-16. BM 10.953/1942. VII. res. – strictly confidential report April 10, 1942.

OL-K63-21-74/pol.-1942. (April 30.) Report of Döme Sztójay to Miklós Kállay. For Hitler's speech, see: In: *Küzdelem a sátánnal* , 437-454.

OL-K63-2/b-1943.-4508/7.

OL-K64-Papers of the reserved political department of the Foreign Ministry. Branch of the Royal Hungarian Police at Csáktornya 39/1-1942. (May 1.) Report to the Chief of Police.

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OL-K70-2/b-148/res.-1942. (May 20.) Report of Márió Spányi to Miklós Kállay.

OL-K63-7-37/pol. 1942. (May 20.) Report of Márió Spányi to Miklós Kállay.

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OL-K149-BM 13.490-1942. VII. res. – Note to Foreign Ministry, a copy of internal report of Ministry of Defense Vkf. 18.757/el. 2.-1942. (June 14.) attached.

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OL-K63-65- 116/pol.-1942. (July 15.) Report of Lajos Kuhl to Miklós Kállay.

OL-K63-1942-67- 92/pol.-1942. (August 14.) Report of László Bartók to Miklós Kállay.

On this, most recently see: Ancel, Jean: The suspension of the plan to deport Romanian Jews to Poland in September-October 1942 and the Transylvanian Issue (manuscript, 2004.)

OL-K63-27-II-1942- 291/pol.-1942. (September 3.) Report of László Nagy to Miklós Kállay.

OL-K63-1942-65- 142/pol.-1942. (September 4.) Report of Lajos Kuhl to Miklós Kállay.

Kárász, József: Berlini nyár [Summer in Berlin], 1942. *Új Magyarorság* , September 5, 1942.

Küzdelem a sátán ellen , 464. Sztójay commented on Hitler's speech in his report of October 3. See Note 5.

OL-K99-1942-719.- Informatory letter of the Foreign Ministry 6868/1942. (October 2.) to Ambassador Zoltán Máriássy in Rome.

OL-K149-20.722/1942. (October 7.) BM-VII. res. report.

Miklós Kállay's speech was discussed in detail by the liberal *8 órai újság* , October 23, 1942.

See Note 2.